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RUSSELL A. MILLER*

On Hostility and Hospitality: Othering Pierre Legrandt
Pierre Legrand's return to the pages of the American Journal
of Comparative Law after nearly twenty years is cause for reflection on the reasons for this prolific comparatist'sabsence from one
of the discipline's leading scholarly fora. One reason is the widespread disdain aimed at Legrand as a result of his persistent,
sharply critical,and often pointedly personal crusade against the
discipline's accepted approaches and their most prominent practitioners. This is partly the nature of the article he publishes in
this collection, which features a no-holds-bared, uncomplimentary
assessment of the work of James Gordley. In this Article I argue
that Legrand's exile is a poor response to his sharp-tongued but
profoundly important vision for our discipline. The better path,
one I try to map here, would be to challenge Legrand by exposing
the ways in which his hostility for comparative law's "established
scholars"clashes with the Derridiancritical theory that animates
all of his work.
"It is because our responsibility to the Other is definitive
of the self, rather than threatening to it, that the boundary
between self and Other becomes significant as the threshold
of an unconditional hospitality rather than an ever-present
possibility of war ....

INTRODUCTION

Pierre Legrand has returned to the pages of the American
Journal of Comparative Law.2 This begs an uncomfortable question.
* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. I am
indebted to Gerhard Poppenberg (University of Heidelberg) and Matthias Schmidt
(Heidelberg Max Planck Institute) for insightful and illuminating conversations
about this material. I am also indebted to T.J. Briggs (W&L Law 2018) for valued
research assistance in the preparation of this Article.
t http://dx.doi/org/10.1093/ajcl/avx025
1. Gideon Baker, Cosmopolitanism as Hospitality:Revisiting Identity and
Differences in Cosmopolitanism,34 ALTERNATIVES 107, 117 (2009).

2. See Pierre Legrand, Jameses at Play: A Tractation on the Comparison of
Laws, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2017).
© The Author [20171. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American
Society of Comparative Law. All rights reserved. For permissions, please
e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
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Why have almost twenty years passed-his remarkable dialogue
with Professor Merryman appeared in 1999 3-since Legrand last
4
published in our discipline's flagship journal?

It is not for a lack of productivity or prominence.5
There are surely a number of reasons for this inhabilis oblivio,
many attributable to Legrand himself. In the last decade, for exam-

ple, he has been involved in the launch of an alternative forum for
scholarship in comparative legal studies. In that time, Legrand has
contributed more than a dozen reviews, essays, and articles to the
Journalof ComparativeLaw, 6 most recently a sweeping reflection on

and reevaluation of his (dis)position in our field. 7 Some of this work
has canonical status and the American Journalof Comparative Law
would have been fortunate to publish it. I do not know if Legrand
submitted any of these (or other) texts to the American Journal of
Comparative Law, only to have them refused.8 Legrand's exile also
surely has something to do with his harshly critical engagement
with the work of many of the discipline's leading figures and prevailing approaches. 9 The fallout from these relentless, tetchy encounters is evident in the circumstances surrounding the publication of
his article Jameses at Play: A Tractation on the Comparison of Laws
in this issue of the American Journal of Comparative Law. 10 It has
3. See Pierre Legrand, John Henry Merryman and ComparativeLegal Studies:
A Dialogue, 47 Am.J. COMP. L. 3 (1999).
4. Legrand bestows this status on the Journal.See Legrand, supra note 2, at 11.
5. Legrand features prominently in many surveys of the discipline. See MATHIAS
SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW 109-14 (2014). Siems concludes that "Pierre Legrand's
research deserves special attention. Legrand is one of the most prolific - but also one
of the most controversial - contemporary comparatists." Id. at 110.
6. See generally Pierre Legrand, A Review of Teemu Ruskola's Legal Orientalism,
8 J. Comp.L. 444 (2014); Pierre Legrand, Proofof Foreign Law in US Courts:A Critique
of Epistemic Hubris,8 J. COMP. L. 343 (2013); Pierre Legrand, Book Review of Feminist
Constitutionalism (Beverley Baines et al. eds.), 8 J. Comp.L. 318 (2013); Pierre Legrand,
Book Review of The DerivativeAction in Asia (Dan W.Puchniak et al. eds.), 7 J. Comp.
L. 347 (2012); Pierre Legrand, Book Review of Madhavi Sunder's From Goods to a
Good Life, 7 J. COMP. L. 248 (2012); Pierre Legrand, Foreign Law: Understanding
Understanding, 6 J. COMP. L. 67 (2011); Pierre Legrand, Book Review of Vicki
C. Jackson's ConstitutionalEngagement in a TransnationalEra, 5 J. CoMP. L. 387 (2011);
Pierre Legrand, Book Review of Bruno Latour's The Making of Law, 5 J. COMP. L. 280
(2011); Pierre Legrand, Book Review of Richard Hyland's Gifts, 4 J. CoMP. L. 309 (2010);
Pierre Legrand, Book Review of The Oxford Handbook of ComparativeLaw (Matthias
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.), 2 J. CoMP. L. 253 (2007); Pierre Legrand,
ComparativeLegal Studies and the Matter of Authenticity, 1 J. COMP. L. 365 (2006);
Pierre Legrand, Antivonbar, 1 J. Comp. L. 13 (2006) [hereinafter Legrand, Antivonbar].
7. See Pierre Legrand, Negative ComparativeLaw, 10 J. CoMP. L. 405 (2015).
8. The disdain Legrand harbors for the "orthodoxy" in the discipline suggests
that he has not been warmly welcomed by its mainstream institutions. In particular,
he aims his vituperation at the "gatekeepers" who edit the discipline's "principal journals." See Legrand, supra note 2, at 10. See also Legrand, supra note 7, at 407 ("To
counter positivism ... would be perilous, so fraught with danger in fact that the critical comparatist might at any moment be confined to one kind of silence or another by
any of the field's 'gate-keepers' (a silence that might in turn prompt the deepest part
of him also to fall silent).").
9. See SIEMS, supra note 5, at 110 ("A significant proportion of [Legrand's]
research is openly confrontational.").
10. Legrand, supra note 2.
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been a protracted effort burdened by controversy, necessitating the
publication of responses, a solicited critique, and ultimately a phalanx of contributions from other comparatists whose participation in
the collection is meant to mitigate the risk of publishing an articlejust markings on a page-authored by Pierre Legrand. My Article
is part of this ungainly, Potemkin arrangement, which might substantiate Legrand's worst suspicions about the discipline's thrall to
orthodoxy and punishing exclusivity.l At the very least it confirms
that Legrand has some well-placed and determined detractors in this
business.
All of this poses some beautiful ironies: a disciplinary melodrama stirred by a text produced by the comparatist least likely to
acknowledge the possibility of a discipline, to believe in the text's
existence, or to credit the significance of his authorship of it. That
framing of this publication event merits our attention, too. But
I have a more modest ambition. I want to consider the reason for all
the trouble: why does Pierre Legrand engender so much hostility?
And then I would like to offer a gentle rebuke of the discipline's reaction to Legrand by suggesting a more critically-informed response
to his work. I come here not to bury Pierre Legrand, but to praise
him-by offering his work the dignity of taking seriously the theoretical claims at the heart of his project. More than his exclusion (or,
now, his inclusion and encirclement), we would do better to interrogate the degree to which Pierre Legrand lives up to his declared theoretical ambitions.

I.

ON HOSTILITY

Pierre Legrand has been on the attack for a long time. Even in
his earliest comparative law contributions one feels him straining at
the bit of the discipline's settled ways.' 2 In interviews, book reviews,
and articles he has challenged what he regards as the impoverished
jurisprudence of positivism and logocentrism that informs some
of comparative law's most widely accepted endeavors, including
11. See id. at 10-11.
12. See generally Pierre Legrand, What "Legal Transplants", in ADAPTING
LEGAL CULTURES 55 (David Nelkin & Johannes Fees eds., 2001); Pierre Legrand, Are
Civilians Educable, 18 LEGAL STUD. 216 (1998); Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of
"Legal Transplants",4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & Comp. L. 111 (1997) [hereinafter Legrand,
The Impossibility of "Legal Transplants"];Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil
Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44 (1997); Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not
Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996) [hereinafter Legrand, European Legal
Systems Are Not Converging];Pierre Legrand, Bureaucratsat Play: The New Quebec
Civil Code, 10 BRIT. J. CANADIAN STUD. 52 (1995); Pierre Legrand, A DiabolicalIdea, in
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 245 (A.S. Hartkamp et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2004) (1995);
Pierre Legrand, Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to Theory, 58 MOD.
L. REV. 262 (1995); Pierre Legrand, Civil-Law Codification in Quebec: A Case of
Decivilianization,1 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR EUROPAISCHES PRIVATRECHT 574 (1993).
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functionalism, 13 common core projects, 14 legal transplants,1 5 and the
16
European legal harmonization agenda.
Often this has taken a sharply ad homonym turn. This habit is
epitomized by his article Antivonbar, which was the first full-length
work to appear in the new Journalof Comparative Law.'7 The article
is a bellicose rejection of the legal positivism that informs Christian
von Bar's work-in the context of European harmonization-to
develop a new civil code for all of Europe.' That perspective surely
would have made Legrand few friends, especially among sectarian Europeanists. 19 But his rough treatment of von Bar (and others
in the context of other projects) have made enemies among the discipline's "established academics. ' 20 For those who find him objectionable (or worse), Legrand has crossed the line of scholarly civility with
his characterization of von Bar as almost touchingly naive. 2 1 Legrand
explains that his eight-year-old daughter also does not feel the
need to pursue an ontological or critical examination of the world.
Legrand accuses von Bar of lacking a "sophisticated theory" and, thus,
operating far below the level of the Greek philosophers.2 3 Instead,
Legrand finds von Bar to be fetishistically rational, scientific, categorical, monistic, formalist, instrumentalist, and imperial. 2 4 In short:
German. In Legrand's view the case against von Bar is not mitigated
by the fact that von Bar's posture seems to be unconscious and involuntary. The German private law scholar is still perpetrating logocide,
Legrand argues, because von Bar's pursuit of a European civil code
will require him to "chloroform" and "wring the neck" of the common
law, with its modest but culturally significant European presence.
13. See Legrand, supra note 2, at 39-41; Pierre Legrand, Paradoxically,Derrida:
For a Comparative Legal Studies, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 631 (2005) [hereinafter
Legrand, Paradoxically,Derridal;Pierre Legrand, The Same and the Different, in
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 240, 245-49, 250-51, 261-63,
288, 300-01 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003);
14. See generally Legrand, Paradoxically,Derrida,supra note 13, at 660 n.159.
15. See generally Legrand, The Impossibility of "LegalTransplants",supra note 12.
16. See generally Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, supra
note 12.
17. See Legrand, Antivonbar, supranote 6.
18. See generally Study Group on a European Civil Code, http://www.sgecc.net/.
See also Christian von Bar, The Role of ComparativeLaw in the Making of European
Private Law, 20 JURIDICA INT'L 5 (2013); Christian von Bar, A Common Frame of
Reference for EuropeanPrivate Law - Academic Efforts and PoliticalRealities, 23 TUL.
EUR. & Civ. L. F. 37 (2008); Christian von Bar, A Civil Code for Europe, 13 JURIDISK
TIDSKRIFT VID STOCKHOLMS UNIVERSITET 3 (2001); Christian von Bar, The Study Group on
a European Civil Code, TIDSKRIFT: UTGIVEN AV JURIDISKA FORENINGEN 323 (2000).
19. A fate Legrand is willing to tempt when he acknowledges, in a mocking tone,
"How could any 'good European' disapprove of a European civil code?" See Legrand,
Antivonbar, supra note 6, at 15.
20. Legrand, supra note 2, at 9-10.
21. See Legrand, Antivonbar, supra note 6, at 15.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 19.
24. See id. at 21.
25. Id. at 23, 25.
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Legrand shows no sign of relenting in this personalized critical
crusade. Jameses at Play involves a similar ad homonym take-down
of James Gordley, who Legrand says is guilty of the same sins as von
Bar. Legrand accuses Gordley of a "stunningly selective sense of curiosity."26 Gordley's work, Legrand concludes, offers only "rigormortis"
as a result of its "(obsolete) epistemic framework,' 27 its naivet6, 28 its
colonial and hegemonic impulses, 29 and its "autistic attitude regarding culture."3° Legrand argues 31that Gordley offers only a "narcotizing
and crippling comparativism."
There may be a new and less caustic side of Legrand emerging, even if it comes too late to spare von Bar, Gordley, and others. In Negative Comparative Law, Legrand warmly praises
Guanter Frankenberg who has been an "outstanding participant in
[Legrand's] intellectual life by virtue of his critique of the theory and
practice of'comparative law.' 32 And Jameses at Play is a comparison
of comparatists in which Gordley fares poorly but James Whitman
attracts Legrand's approval for (as Legrand interprets his work)
occupying "a specifically dissentaneous or aversive intellectual position vis-A-vis ... the field's governing epistemic doctrines."3 3 Legrand
applauds Whitman for making the case for an "encultured conception
34
of the law."
Despite his newly accommodating stance, Legrand is widely
known for his hostile treatment of fellow comparatists and, by his
own account, he has reaped their hostility in return. Legrand documents all of this at the conclusion of Antivonbar when, in a breathtaking flourish, he preemptively declares:
It is now time for all those civilians who have never studied the common law in the common-law world, who have
never taught the common law in the common-law world,
for whom the common law is a bdance, to dismiss my argument as "strident", "exaggerated", "extreme", "conservative", "reactionary" - of course, a civil code for Europe is the
epitome of a genuinely "cutting-edge" idea: a code to modify
other codes.. .hello Sisyphus! - "pessimistic", "skeptical",
26. Legrand, supra note 2, at 9.
27. Id. at 66.
28. Id. at 75.
29. See id. at 3, 42, 81, 89.
30. Id. at 91.
31. Id. at 105.
32. Legrand, supra note 7, at 406 (citing Giinter Frankenberg, Critical
Comparisons:Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411 (1985)). See
GUNTER FRANKENBERG, COMPARATIVE LAW AS CRITIQUE (2016); Simone Glanert & Pierre
Legrand, Review of Frankenberg'sComparativeLaw as Critique - Law, Comparatism,
and Epistemic Governance: There Is Critique and Critique, 18 GERMAN L.J. (forthcoming 2017).
33. Legrand, supra note 2, at 14.
34. Id. at 17.
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"destructive" - but what if what is being destroyed is itself
destructive? - "anti-European", "caustic", "lofty", "disdainful", "occult", "ponderous", "wrong", "flawed", "esoteric",
"hyperbolic", "silly", "blustery", "insubordinate", "somber"
perhaps, "bad", "confrontational", "insane", "iconoclastic", "flippant", "innocent", "ambitious", "arcane", "bitter",
"recondite", "irreverent" (I have actually heard this one!),
'self-serving", "vacuous", "sophomoric", "left-leaning", "rightleaning", "left-wing", "rightwing", "extreme-left", "extremeright", "wrong-headed", "self-important", "Cassandralike",
and "full of crap" (a "collegial" observation that I overheard
on the occasion of a colloquium in Paris on 23 March 2001
during the mid-afternoon interlude: ah! ces chers collgues...), or otherwise benighted ....
Why was any of this mutually assured disdain necessary?
Could Legrand have advanced his important critique of our pathologies without bear-baiting the discipline with these personal
attacks? The cynics are bound to suspect that, despite the resulting exile and the disapproval that fuels it, and despite his expressions of dismay at those consequences, Legrand has not regretted
the notoriety his attacks have brought him. It is true that Legrand
(and a poorly-conceived, poorly-understood characterization of his
critique) is present at most comparative law events I attend, even
if he is not on the list of speakers. But that explanation is a cheap
dodge. There is more to it than martyrdom or self-aggrandizement.
Legrand writes the way he does because he cares passionately
about our work and the values it embodies and communicates. This
points to at least two insights.
First, his fiery approach is itself a stylistic condemnation of the
scientized "dispassion" that characterizes the work of most comparatists, suggesting what Legrand considers to be a wholly fallacious and essentially impossible-and therefore worryingly
dangerous-impartiality. Christian von Bar, he agonizes, believesor tells us that he believes-"that the European civil code will be
'impartial', 'dispassionate', and 'neutral'."36 And, as Legrand emphatically rejects the possibility of these conditions in comparative law,
his partial, passionate, and partisan rhetoric is both a critique of this
all-too-frequent mantle donned by comparatists and it is a model
(even if exaggerated) for a more honest, self-reflective, self-aware
approach for the discipline.
Second, Legrand is on the attack because he genuinely sees in
the orthodox approaches to comparative law a totalizing (and therefore totalitarian) and intolerant epistemology that has, as those ways
35. Legrand, Antivonbar, supra note 6, at 37.
36. Id. at 15.
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7
of imagining the world always do, disturbingly violent impulses.3
Transplants, if they were even possible, would displace the local,
encultured law. Convergence and harmonization are brutal processes of assimilation with obvious echoes of colonialism. Legal families savagely obscure the plural, diverse realities of law-as-culture.
Legrand explains that, "irrespective of anything else, Professor von
Bar is doing irreparable violence to the common law" in his pursuit of a European civil code. 38 Gordley faces the same indictment.
In Jameses at Play, Legrand aligns himself with Whitman's cultural jurisprudence. And he suggests that their critique represents
39
an act of violence aimed at Gordley's positivist comparative law.
But this is nothing like the savage harm that Gordley's positivism
does "by discrediting culture and dismissing the argument for lawas-culture. ' 40 Legrand insists that the culturalist's violence strives to
do justice to the law, even if it will fail fully to do so. But the positivist's violence (as practiced by von Bar and Gordley, for example)
tears open a gap between law and justice. This "systematic brutality,"
Legrand argues, is achieved through the "deployment of control, mastery, subordination, or confinement-domineeringly to drive a wedge
between the legal and the cultural. ' 41 It can be disputed whether
Legrand is right about all of this. But no one can doubt that he
believes that he is right. And if that is the case, then his barbed critiques (causing trivial collateral damage in the form of some bruised
egos) are necessary measures in a desperate struggle to redeem our
discipline for tolerance, understanding, pluralism . . . and life. On
these terms might it be said that Legrand moves too gingerly?

II.

OTHERING LEGRAND

These insights might help us to understand Legrand's place
in our discipline. Except that his hostility towards the orthodox
approaches to comparative law-and its prominent practitionersflouts some of the central elements of the Derridean critical theory
that animates his work.
37. See generally CHRISTIAN GERLACH & NICOLAS WERTH, State Violence-Violent
Societies, in BEYOND TOTALITARIANISM: STALINISM AND NAZISM COMPARED 133 (Michael
Geyer & Sheila Fitzpatrick eds., 2009). See also HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF
TOTALITARIANISM (1951); HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE (1970).

38. Legrand, Antivonbar, supra note 6, at 30.
39. See Legrand, supra note 2, at 18. Legrand seeks to link Whitman to an
anti-positivist campaign by noting that Whitman shared Legrand's dismal view of
H. Patrick Glenn's seminal work Legal Traditions of the World. Id. at 14-15 nn.3334. In fact, in his review of the book, Whitman exhibits the kind of sharp-tongued
rhetoric more commonly attributed to Legrand. "Lovers of serious scholarship,"
Whitman concluded, "are sure to dislike this book," that this is "a poorly executed,
self-indulgent piece of work . . . " James Q. Whitman, A Simple Story: Review of
Glenn's Legal Traditions of the World, 4 RECHTSGESCHICHTE 206-08 (2006).
40. Legrand, supra note 2, at 19.
41. Id. at 97.
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Legrand's harsh words are reserved for comparative law's orthodoxy and its prominent practitioners. In Jameses at Play, he explains
that orthodoxy consists in a "strategic and generative power, whose
hegemonic logic, commands consent on the part of comparativists
jointly and severally."42 So far, in my accounting of Legrand's portrayals of von Bar and Gordley, I have only provided a sketch of what he
views the substance of that doxa to be. Legrand can make the fuller
case for this view in the article that publishes as part of this collection. For my purposes, more detail is not necessary. Instead, it is
enough for my examination of the Derridean integrity of Legrand's
work, to note that Legrand fundamentally defines his approach
in dialectical opposition to the discipline's orthodoxy, whatever he
believes that to be. Legrand's categorical dialecticism, for example,
calls for comparative law's embrace of "incommensurability (of the
kind I advocate)" as a "challenge to Professor von Bar's monism precisely because it holds that the world is irreducibly plural in character, that it is organised, for example, in various modes of cognition
that do not fit within a single frame (other than in a perfectly superficial and, therefore, uninteresting way)."43 Legrand does this repeatedly in his work, insisting on a dichotomy between the discipline's
mainstream and his "marginal/oppositional discourse" that is outside
of comparative law's center.44 Legrand's comparative legal studies
exists essentially, perhaps exclusively, as a foil for the orthodox in
the discipline.
He insists on this dichotomy in part, as I have described above,
by disparaging the discipline's leading practitioners. This constitutes
a two-fold betrayal of Derrida. First, Legrand seems to fail to internalize the nature and role of the "other" in Derrida's critical theory,
which fundamentally rejects the exteriority of the "other." Second,
Legrand misses altogether the hospitality Derrida demands that we
extend to the "other."
A.

The "Self" and the "Other"

It is appropriate to judge Legrand against a Derridian standard.
Derrida's critical theory constitutes the philosophical framework for
Legrand's comparativism-for his comparison of laws, his comparative legal studies, and his negative comparative law.45 Legrand is

the author and editor of a number of works engaging with Derrida,
42. Id. at 3.
43. Legrand, Antivonbar, supra note 6, at 19.
44. Pierre Legrand, "II n'y a pas de hors-texte:" Intimations of Jacques Derrida as
Comparatist-at-Law,in DERRIDA AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 125 (Peter Goodrich et al. eds.,

2008).

45. "I did not beseech Derrida. Rather, he came to me through the very good
fortune of a key encounter with a colleague to whom I continue to feel profoundly
indebted." Pierre Legrand, Siting Foreign Law: How Derrida Can Help, 21 DuKE
J. COMP. & INT'L L. 595,596 (2010-2011).
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including an expansive reader linking Derrida and the law, 46 and
a number of chapters and articles.4 7 A representative example of
Legrand's alignment with Derrida is the book chapter 'II n'y a pas
de hors-texte:' Intimations of Jacques Derrida as Comparatistat-Law, which appeared in the edited volume Derrida and Legal
Philosophy.48 In the chapter Legrand depicts "his Derrida ' '49 as striving to realize a subversive "politics of location" in the face of "insurpassable alterity."5° The ethical response to these factors, Legrand
concludes, is an embrace of Derrida's affirmation of "the possibility for the other tone, or the tone of an other, to come at any time to
interrupt a familiar music." 5 1 It is, according to Legrand, a "philosophy of resistance to the univocity of meaning."52 Central to Derrida's
critique, as Legrand asserts it, is an affirmation of the "other," on
one hand, and the affirmation of the "interpreter-as-he-affirms-theother," on the other hand. 53 Legrand's project has been the application of these lessons-above all the avowal of the "other-in-law"-to
comparative legal studies:
For Derrida, indeed, something like comparison can only
materialize as an affirmative (and unlimited) response to the
call of the other. In other terms, comparison's inherent political and ethical vocation can only be as a response to the other.
In Derrida's words, "nothing essential will be done if one does
not allow oneself to be summoned by the other.". . . Derrida
goes further still: not only is there an obligation to the other,
but there must also be vigilance for the other. It is not enough
for comparison to be concerned with the other. Derrida
defends a non-totalizing thought, a thought that accepts the
other as interlocutor,... that allows the other (including the
other-in-law) to signify according to himself and to his own
obviousness, that accepts that the other is not only a modality
of the self, that acknowledges the irreducibility of the other
to
54
other.
the
for
emphatically,
and
ultimately
is,
that
self,
the
Yet, in exaggerating Derrida's insistence on the respect owed
to the "other," Legrand is working with an incomplete version of
Derrida's summons. Not only does the "other" need to exist according
46. DERRIDA AND LAW (Pierre Legrand ed., 2009).
47. See Legrand, supra note 45. See also Pierre Legrand, Derrida/Law:
A Differend, in A COMPANION TO DERRIDA 581 (Zeynep Direk & Leonard Lawlor eds.,
2014); Pierre Legrand, Jacques in the Book (On Apophasis), 23 LAW AND LITERATURE
282 (2011); Pierre Legrand, The Verge of Foreign Law-With Derrida, 1 ROMANIAN
J. CoMp. L. 73 (2010); Legrand, Paradoxically,Derrida,supra note 13.
48. Legrand, supra note 44.
49. Id. at 140.
50. Id. at 140, 142.
51. Id. at 141.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 141-42 (citations omitted).
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to his own obviousness, but the "other's" definitive and categorical
role in marking out the boundaries of the "self" is so fundamental as
to render the "other" an essential, indispensable, and interwoven facet
of the "self." They are one. The meaning of this fundamental interdependence of the "self' and "other" is explored in a playful homage to
Emmanuel Levinas in which Derrida quotes Levinas as observing:
'Responsibility for the other, going against intentionality and
the will which intentionality does not succeed in dissimulating, signifies not the disclosure of a given and its reception,
but the exposure of me to the other, prior to every decision.
There is a claim laid on the Same by the other in the core of
myself, the extreme tension of the command exercised by the
Other in me over me, a traumatic hold of the other on the
55
Same, which does allow the Same time to await the other.'
Later, in the same essay, Derrida embraces Levinas' metaphor of the
parent and the child to illustrate the insuperability of the "self" and
"other": "'Paternity is a relation with the stranger who while being
Other [autrui] ...is me; a relationship of the ego with a self which is

nevertheless not me."'56
Legrand never comes close to this kind of reconciliation with
the despised orthodoxy of the discipline, which remains structurally exterior-irreconcilably "other"-to his ethics of enculturation
in comparative legal studies. He chides von Bar (the Roman-German
civilian jurist) with the suggestion that "the common law is Professor
von Bar's own other, the difference of his belonging-which Professor
von Bar is unable to encounter as addressing his own deficiencies
and incapacities."5 7 But the same thing must be said of Legrand's hotpursuit of the discipline's "established academics" and their orthodox
approaches. Zweigert and Kotz (it is always these two!) are no less
Legrand's own other, the difference of his belonging to our discipline.
Legrand needs them more than he admits, so much in fact, that the
established scholars he criticizes (von Bar, and now Gordley) represent the very possibility of his critique's existence. They are one.
B. The "Other"and Hospitality
Even if Legrand cannot complete Derrida's difficult journey to
the "other" back into the "self," Derrida makes another demand on
us in our encounters with the "other." We are to extend the "other"
hospitality, not hostility. It should be clear from his persistent
aggression towards the discipline's orthodoxy and its prominent
practitioners that Legrand has missed this essential summons, too.
Because it is the Derridian basis for all Legrand's claims for an
55. Jacques Derrida, At This Very Moment in This Work, in A DERRIDA READER 405,
413 (Peggy Kamuf ed., 1991).
56. Id. at 429.
57. Legrand, Antivonbar,supra note 6, at 23.
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the other-in-law,
ethical comparative law that affirms and respects
58
this failing is a more serious problem for Legrand.
Derrida considers hospitality to be so fundamental to human
nature and communication that he concludes that it should govern
all interaction. 9 It is my argument that, for Legrand the Derridian
comparatist, it must also govern his encounters with the discipline's
orthodox "others".
There are some recurring themes in Derrida's work on hospitality. Andrew Shryock, for example, describes them (in a comparison with Bedouin philosophy on hospitality) as "most strikingly, the
excessive, ideal, impossible, transcendent, and dangerous qualities
of the relationship between guest and host,' 60 and more broadly as
"themes of welcome, trespass, sacrifice, risk, substitution, lack of
calculation, harboring the nameless guest, giving hospitality without reciprocity in mind, as the unexpected act, surprising and selfless, that transcends politics and overcomes the law."61 Gideon Baker
distills Derrida's ethics of hospitality down to this: ". . . where our
awareness of the identity of the stranger as a fellow human being
seeking refuge is opposed by the irreducible difference of the
stranger as 'other' - someone who, as a guest in a home not his own,
suffers the violence of assimilation. '62 Judith Still explains that hospitality is "by definition a structure that regulates relations between
63
inside and outside, and, in that sense, between private and public."
It is perhaps in Still's sense that the demands of hospitality touch on
Legrand's comparativism.
In deconstructing the word "hospitality" Derrida followed its
roots to words meaning "stranger," .guest," and "power."64 This
"deconstruction" preserved distance between the host and the "other,"
maintaining the idea of the host retaining ownership of his property
while inviting the "other" into his home ("home" here used loosely, as
the "host" could be anything from a single person in a private sphere
to a nation). 65 Derrida's "other," in contrast with Levinas's "Other,"
is never capitalized, and is separated from the idea of the "other"
58. "Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one ethic among others." JACQUES
16 (Mark Dooley & Richard Kearney
trans., 2005).
59. See Mark W. Westmoreland, Interruptions:Derridaand Hospitality, 2 KRITIKE
1, 3 (2008).
60. Andrew Shryock, Hospitality Lessons: Learning the Shared Language of
Derrida and the Balga Bedouin, 31 PARAGRAPH EUP SPECIAL ISSUES - EXTENDING
HOSPITALITY: GIVING SPACE, TAXING TIME 32, 35 (2009).
61. Id. at 41.
62. Gideon Baker, Cosmopolitanism as Hospitality: Revisiting Identity and
Differences in Cosmopolitanism, 34 ALTERNATIVES: GLOBAL, LOCAL, POLITICAL 107, 109
(2009). This relates to a pithier idea that preoccupies Derrida: ethics as hospitality.
63. See JUDITH STILL, DERRIDA AND HOSPITALITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 13 (2010).
64. See Kevin O'Gorman, Jacques Derrida's Philosophy of Hospitality, 8
HOSPITALITY REV. 50, 52 (2006).
65. See id.
DERRIDA, ON COSMOPOLITANISM AND FORGIVENESS
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as being a divine entity.66 Derrida, instead, focused on the "other" in

opposition to the person or entity obliged to extend hospitality. The
"other" could be a guest, an immigrant, or anyone exterior to the
host-perhaps even one's disputant in debates over comparative law
theory and method. Derrida viewed hospitality as a host's relationship to the "other," not just the presence of the other in someone's
life or country or space. Hospitality, as a relationship with an "other,"
has to be reinvented constantly as a process of moment-to-moment
adaptation to that "otherly" presence.67 The "'other"-whether invited
guest, immigrant, or a neighbor one encounters-is, by nature, foreign. It is also possible to reverse perspectives. Instead of defining
hospitality as the ethics of our encounters with the "other," it might
also be said that anyone receiving hospitality is an "other."
Much of Derrida's philosophy on hospitality reached outside the
idea of hospitality in the home and moved into the political sphere,
including the space wherein debate over comparative theory and
method takes place.69
A recurring theme in Derrida's work is the idea of "unconditional" hospitality, the obligation to extend hospitality to absolutely
anyone, even if their presence as the "other" is not anticipated or
desired. Derrida somewhat confusingly refers to unconditional hospitality as "the Law of hospitality" as opposed to "the laws of hospitality," which would be the duties and rights of the host(s) and
guest(s). 70 Derrida said that a host had to be prepared to receive the
guest without expecting there to even be a guest: "If I welcome only
what I welcome, what I am ready to welcome, and that I recognize in
advance because I expect the coming of the h6te (guest) as invited,
there is no hospitality."71 This unconditional hospitality never asks
the host to demand any type of behavior from the "other," including
identification of themselves. Even if that meant giving up "mastery
or your home," then so be it. 72 Derrida acknowledged that this was
"unbearable," but it was part of pure or unconditional hospitality.73
Unconditional (also called "absolute" or "pure") hospitality
requires a host to always say yes in his encounters with the "other"
66. This is not to say that Derrida never considers the "other-ness" of something like God. Generally, however, in his work on hospitality Derrida is referring
to the lower-case "other" as being human/mortal and not divine. See KAS SAGHAFI,
APPARITIONS-OF DERRIDA'S OTHER 9 (2000).

67. See id.
68. See Shryock, supra note 60, at 44.
69. Judith Still's book has a chapter dedicated to the relationship between hospitality and religion. See STILL, supra note 63, at 51-93.
70. Jacques Derrida, Step of Hospitality / No Hospitality (Pas d'hospitalit6),in
OF HOSPITALITY: ANNE DUFOURMANTELLE INVITES JACQUES DERRIDA TO RESPOND 77 (Rachel
Bowlby trans., 2000).
71. Shryock, supra note 60, at 41 (citing Jacques Derrida, Hostipitality, in
JACQUES DERRIDA: ACTS OF RELIGION 358-420 (2002)).
72. O'Gorman, supra note 64, at 54.
73. Id.
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(Derrida sometimes uses the French word arrivant, or newcomer),
even without the "other" having to first identify himself.7 4 Derrida
explains:
[A]bsolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and
that I give not only to the foreigner (provided with a family
name, with the social status of being a foreigner, etc.), but
to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that I give
place to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive,
and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of
them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their
names.

75

The idea of unconditional hospitality relies on the fact that it is
actually impossible. Derrida frequently acknowledged that the condition of unconditional hospitality depends instead on the existence of
"laws of hospitality."76 According to Still, Derrida's "laws of hospitality" referred to a moral code in social situations as well as political
laws and rights. 77 These laws are conditional, and they place restrictions on hospitality. These conditional laws ".

.

. establish a right to

and a duty in hospitality [but] simultaneously place terms and conditions on hospitality (political, juridical, moral), ordaining that this
right should be given always under certain conditions: as, for example, that there should exist certain restrictions in the right of entry
and stay of the foreigner."78 Derrida explains the seeming opposition
between unconditional hospitality and the conditions needed for its
realization by explaining that "conditional laws would cease to be
laws of hospitality if they were not guided, given inspiration, given79
aspiration, required, even, by the law of unconditional hospitality."
If unconditional hospitality exists, then an absolute "other" exists in
relation to it.80 This absolute "other" is the "other" that one who practices absolute hospitality must be waiting for; they are absolutely
"other" because they cannot be named, cannot have a family name,
cannot have a face or figure or origin. They are truly other, and absolute hospitality allows a host to say, "I give place to them." Absolute
hospitality, in Derrida's view, had to include not only a defined foreigner (whether one from another country or just one from the next
house over), but this absolute "other" as well.8 ' Acceptance of the
74. See Gerasimos Kakoliris, Jacques Derrida on the Ethics of Hospitality, in
144, 146 (Elvis
Imafidon ed., 2015).
75. Id. at 147.
76. Id. at 146.
77. STILL, supra note 63, at 5.
78. Id.
79. Derrida, supra note 70, at 79.
80. See Jacques Derrida, Foreigner Question, in OF HOSPITALITY: ANNE
DUFOURMANTELLE INVITES JACQUES DERRIDA TO RESPOND 3, 25 (Rachel Bowlby trans., 2000).
81. See id.
THE ETHICS OF SUBJECTIVITY: PERSPECTIVES SINCE THE DAWN OF MODERNITY
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absolute "other" requires taking them in without even asking their
name, origin, or indeed without asking them to even speak the host's
language.
O'Gorman explains:
For pure hospitality or a pure gift to occur, however, there
must be an absolute surprise. The "other", like the Messiah,
must arrive whenever he or she wants. She may even not
arrive. I would oppose, therefore, the traditional and religious concept of "visitation" to "invitation": visitation implies
the arrival of someone who is not expected, who can show
up at any time. If I am unconditionally hospitable I should
welcome the visitation, not the invited guest, but the visitor.
I must be unprepared, or prepared to be unprepared, for the
unexpected arrival of any "other". Is this possible? I don't
know. If, however, there is pure hospitality, or a pure gift,
it should consist in this opening without horizon, without
horizon of expectation, an opening to the newcomer whoever
that may be. It may be terrible because the newcomer may
be a good person, or may be the devil.
Even if unconditional hospitality is impossible, Derrida did not
see this unattainability as being indicative of some ethical failing on
the part of the host.8 3 As one would expect from Derrida, this impossibility merely serves to define its own opposite-the possibility of
unconditional hospitality. In the existence of strictly conditioned hospitality we see that unconditional hospitality exists as its opposite. 4
By sustaining the substance of unconditional hospitality in this way,
Derrida is able to link tolerance to his demands for hospitality, but
as an opposition to hospitality as well. Tolerance, Derrida explains, is
actually the opposite of hospitality. Or tolerance is at least the limit
of hospitality. "If I think I am being hospitable because I am tolerant,
it is because I wish to limit my welcome, to retain power and maintain control over the limits of my 'home,' my sovereignty ....
Hospitality is something that can be seen as dangerous, as it allows
the "other" to take something away from the host-including something
similar to the academic resources that Legrand accuses the "established" comparatists of enjoying (or squandering).8 6 Yet, if hospitality did
87
not carry some risk or danger with it, then it would not be a virtue.

82. O'Gorman, supra note 64, at 54.
83. STILL, supra note 63, at 9.
84. Derrida often argues that without at least the thought of this pure and
unconditional hospitality, of hospitality itself, we would have no concept of hospitality
in general and would not even be able to determine the rules for conditional hospitality. See id. at 209.
85. Id. at 207.
86. Id. at 13.
87. See id. at 213.
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Marc Cr6pon, talking of both Derrida and Levinas puts it this
way: "[One cannot] speak of hospitality, memory, and mourning
without being mindful of all the denials of hospitality, of all the
abandonments, all the violent deaths, the deportations, and the
extermination of millions upon millions of individuals that mark the
last century."8 8 Cr~pon is relating this claim to a mortality of hospitality. But Derrida's theme of violence is still relevant as well. By
refusing to extend hospitality to the "other" harm may befall them
(in Cr6pon's case, harm will befall them because the host has not
taken into account the mortality of the other).8 9 In Legrand's case,
however, it is not only the risk that a lack of hospitality might leave
his "other" exposed to harm. Instead, by choosing to cast-off Derrida's
summons to hospitality, Legrand is free to undertake his contentious
hostility toward comparative law's orthodox approaches and their
practitioners. As I noted earlier, Legrand has admitted to this violence, which is both the necessary oppositional proof of the existence
of hospitality and the affirmative proof of his turning away from
Derridian hospitality. It should be obvious that hostility of the kind
that characterized Legrand's encounters with the discipline's "established academics" constitutes the negation of hospitality.90
CONCLUSION

The American Journal of Comparative Law, by publishing Pierre
Legrand's article Jameses at Play, has stolen the Derridian advantage on Legrand by offering him the hospitality of scores of pages in
the present issue. My Article and the rest of the awkward framework
for this publication event show the conditionality of the Journal's
hospitality and at the same time affirm the contrasting possibility of
unconditional hospitality to which both the Journal-butalso Pierre
Legrand-are called. It would be Legrand's triumph if his work
could be characterized by less-conditioned hospitality (if not unconditional hospitality) toward his "other" (the positivistic orthodoxy in
comparative law), on whom he is, in any case, categorically dependent for the existence of his encultured approach to comparative
law. Disappointingly, too often and for too long, Legrand has not fulfilled this Derridian mandate. Instead, he has offered the discipline's
"established academics" his closed fist. He has closed the door in the
face of his guests.
All of this matters because Legrand's Derridan understanding of comparative law has so much to teach us, starting with all
the things he advocates about law's social and cultural embeddedness in Jameses at Play. But his failure to fully appreciate
88. Marc Cr6pon, Hospitality and Mortality, in THOUGHT OF DEATH AND THE MEMORY

OF WAR 105, 114 (Michael Loriaux trans., 2013).
89. See id.
90. Derrida, supra note 80, at 14, 53.
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Derrida-including the place of the "other" in the "self" and the
duty of hospitality owed to the "other"-is a regrettable self-inflicted
wound. Legrand's hostility has given his detractors the excuse to
deny him and his work the prominent platform it deserves. More
profoundly, in his harsh assessment of his "other," Legrand departs
from the Derridian foundations for the tolerant and ethical comparative law to which he so passionately-and correctly-summons us.
Legrand, in attacking his "other," harms his "self"-and the discipline that so desperately needs him.

